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A DELICATE TASK: BALANCING THE
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN AND MOTHERS
IN PARENTAL TERMINATION
PROCEEDINGS
Catherine J. Ross
ABSTRACT
This article considers the independent liberty interests of children in foster care
and their mothers in parental termination proceedings. Recent federal reforms
impose a mandatory deadline for the state to terminate parental rights. That
policy erroneously presumes that the passage of time alone establishes parental
fault and satisfies a parent’s due process rights. It also fails to protect the
minority of children who assert an interest in preserving a safe relationship with
mothers who are unlikely to meet the state‘s schedule— including many
substance abusers and victims of domestic violence.

The conflicting interests that can arise among parents, children and the state are
particularly pronounced when the state seeks to terminate parental rights. The
resulting tensions have long been aggravated by the inability of the child welfare
system to find the proper balance between two competing imperatives. The first
requires the state to protect children who are the victims of serious abuse or neglect
and who, it is widely understood, may suffer repeated trauma, and even death, if the
state fails to intervene appropriately. The second imperative is to minimize the
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psychological and social trauma that children often suffer when the state intervenes
to remove them from the families that have failed to meet their basic needs.
Once a child is placed in foster care, the inexorable progress of the case will
presumably lead to only one of two options: return to the family of origin or
termination of parental rights followed by permanent placement in another family.
Thus, from the time a child enters foster care the potential exists for the interests of
child and parent to diverge dramatically. The conflicting interests of child and
parent are often transparent from the day the case file is opened. In other instances,
however, where the state plans simultaneously for reunification or termination of
parental rights, the conflicting interests of child and parent are balanced against
their potential mutual interests as the case progresses.
No one disputes that the stakes in parental termination cases are high. Every
current member of the Supreme Court agrees that “[flew consequences of judicial
action are so grave as the severance of natural family ties” (M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 1996,
p. 119). Although the cases before the Court have focused primarily on the legal
significance and emotional devastation of termination for parents, separation from a
parent is at least as grievous and traumatic for the children involved (Bowlby,
1969a. b; Goldstein et al., 1996). However, the interest that a child may have in
preserving a relationship with a neglectful parent has received short shrift in the
wake of recent federal reforms intended to ensure permanent placements for all
children within a short time after their entry into the foster care system.
Modern rights theory recognizes that minors may have legal claims independent
of their parents that extend beyond their need for nurturance as members of an
intimate association of family members. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997 (ASFA) states “explicitly for the first time in Federal law that a child’s health
and safety must be the paramount consideration when any decision is made
regarding a child in the Nation’s child welfare system.” (Strengthening Abuse and
Neglect Courts Act of 2000) In doing so, ASFA places the potential conflicts of
interest between children and their parents (in most instances their mothers) in stark
relief. ASFA makes permanency “in a safe and stable home, whether it be returning
home, adoption, legal guardianship, or another permanent placement” the goal for
all of the children who enter foster care (Executive Memorandum. 1996). In
keeping with its laudatory goal of moving children quickly out of the child welfare
system to some form of stability, ASFA imposed an innovative federal time line,
intended to insure that no child lingered in foster care for a period of years. By
making the child’s safety and development the priority. ASFA weighs the child’s
security more heavily than the mother’s emotional needs and legal rights.
Looking at ASFA from the perspective of children’s rights, it is hard to see any
drawbacks to ASFA’s categorical approach as applied to the bright line cases. Like
ASFA, this paper is not concerned with the life circumstances that may have led the
“abusive” mother to her predicament or her actions. (In using the term “abusive,” I
refer to the abusers whose label raises no questions — those who torture, drown, or

fail even to note that a child has disappeared.) This article is instead concerned with
those cases that lie outside bright-line labels and examines a paradox at the heart of
recent efforts to improve the child welfare system: in their zeal to focus on the child
in parental termination hearings, lawmakers imposed a categorical formula that
unwittingly harms some children and mothers who are labeled “unfit” because of
neglect.
In the cases at the margins, those involving mothers who may or may not be
neglectful, or who are victims in their own right, ASFA’s categorical treatment of
mothers and children may not serve all children equally well. Unfortunately, the
marginal cases are not rare (American Bar Association, 1993). In this paper, I aim
to highlight a dilemma central to the child welfare system: it may not be possible to
devise a legal principle that equitably addresses the interests of all neglected
children and their mothers. Attempts to impose such a categorical legal principle to
neglect cases may result in less than optimal solutions for some individual children
and mothers, and even instances of flagrant injustice to one or both. On the other
hand, it is incumbent upon the law, and on its theorists as well as its practitioners, to
grapple with the hardest issues. Perhaps no issue is more difficult than the impact of
the passage of time on the respective claims of a parent, a child and the state in the
child welfare system.
Section 1 of this essay reviews the separate rights claims of parents and children.
Section 2 analyzes the key reform of ASFA, which provides that parental rights be
terminated after a child has remained in foster care for 15 out of the preceding 22
months. In doing so, I consider the conflicting interests of the child, the mother and
the state, asking whether the passage of time alone is ever sufficient justification for
terminating parental rights in light of the protections the law affords parents.
Section 3 draws on feminist theory in considering the vital liberty interests and
practical needs of mothers and children in two categories of hard cases: (1) cases
involving substance abusing mothers; and (2) cases involving battered mothers
whose children were removed despite the mother’s success in protecting the child
from observing or experiencing violence. Both of these categories illustrate that, in
some instances, children’s interests might be better served by flexibility where the
child asserts a claim to a continued relationship with a biological parent.

1. RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES: PARENTAL LIBERTY
INTERESTS, DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND THE
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
The vast majority of children live with their mothers, whether in single parent
households, with their father as well as their mother, or with their mother and her
significant other (Fields, 2001; Fields & Casper, 2001). This necessarily means that
where abuse or neglect takes place a mother’s role is likely to be at issue, either as a

perpetrator, for placing the child in harm’s way, or for failure to protect the child
from another adult. Indeed, when we talk about child abuse and neglect we are
almost always talking, at some level, about mothers and their children, even if the
mother’s partner is the abuser.
This section first considers the constitutional rights accorded to parents, regardless of sex, and the ways in which those rights diminish the independent claims of
children. It then offers a way of thinking about children’s legal claims within the
child welfare system separate from those of their parents, with particular emphasis
on the legal regime created by ASFA.
The constitutional rights of parents frequently subsume the legal rights of their
children. The Supreme Court has found a substantive liberty interest in parenting,
which “does not evaporate simply because [the parents] have not been model
parents or have lost temporarily the custody of their child to the State. Even when
blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the
irretrievable destruction of their family life” (Santosky v. Kramer, 1982, p. 753).
The resulting legal presumption that parents speak for their children does not fully
evaporate once the children come to attention of a child welfare agency, or even
once a child enters foster care. Under this legal regime, as opposed to a therapeutic
one, information must be considered in a certain order. Before a court can assume
that the child or someone else claiming to speak for the child (such as the state or an
appointed guardian ad litem) is in a better position than the parent to present the
child’s best interests to the court, the court must determine that the parent has
behaved in a way that justifies stripping the parent of her presumed identity of
interests with her child. Only after such a finding may a court determine that the
parent no longer speaks for this particular child. Consequently, any legislative
initiative designed to elevate the child’s developmental needs over the rights of his
or her parents may conflict with generally applicable constitutional principles
protecting the family unit as a whole. It is critical, therefore, to understand the scope
and strength of the parent’s rights before seeking to explicate the balance of
interests between children and their parents in the context of the child welfare
system.
The substantive due process jurisprudence that governs claims involving a
parent’s liberty interest in his or her child protects parents from government
intervention absent a high threshold (Troxel v. Granville, 2000). In short, any
infringement on the parent’s rights must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest (In re H. G., 2001). But while the government’s compelling interest in
safeguarding children is rarely questioned, the means the government uses to
achieve its goals are frequently the subject of litigation (Ross, 2000).
The liberty interest of parents in their children also mandates procedural protections before a parent’s rights may be terminated. In Stanley v. Illinois (1972) the
Supreme Court held that a state may not deprive a parent of his or her parental
rights without an individualized determination of the parent’s fitness. Speed and
efficiency, the Court declared, may not be allowed to run “roughshod over the

important interests of both parent and child” (p. 657). In subsequent cases the
Supreme Court examined three procedural issues that arise in termination cases:
the right to appointed counsel, the standard of proof, and the right to an appeal.
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) the Court held that due
process does not require appointment of counsel for parents in all termination
proceedings. The Lassiter opinion makes clear, however, that an appellate court
may reverse a trial court’s decision not to appoint counsel if the decision violates
fundamental fairness under the facts of the case. In addition, although the Court
found that appointing counsel is not constitutionally required in all termination
cases, the majority noted that a “wise public policy” would require appointing
counsel for parents who cannot afford attorneys at all stages of dependency proceedings. At the time Lassiter was decided, the Court noted that thirty-three states
and the District of Columbia provided appointed counsel for indigent parents in
termination proceedings, and that nothing suggested that such statutes were other
than “enlightened and wise.” Since then, “there have been substantial dynamic
statutory and procedural developments” regarding the right to counsel in termination proceedings. As of 2002, the Supreme Court of Delaware noted that Delaware
was one of only five states that had not “established a right for indigent parents to
be represented by counsel at State expense in dependency and neglect proceedings.... [either by statute] or as a matter of state constitutional law” (Brown v.
Division of Family Services, 2002).
The Supreme Court has ruminated on the high personal stakes that make termination of parental rights something more than an “ordinary civil action” resulting in
mere loss of money” (Santosky v. Kramer, 1982. pp. 747. 756). In Santosky v.
Kramer (1982), the Supreme Court held that in light of the stakes in termination
proceedings, due process requires that the state support its allegations by an elevated evidentiary standard — “at least clear and convincing evidence” — before it
may “sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child”
(pp. 747—748).
Most recently, in M. L. B. v. S. L. J. (1996), the Supreme Court held that the due
process and equal protection clauses mandate that a state may not deny appellate
review to a person whose parental rights have been terminated. The Court held that
states must provide every parent with access to the appellate courts following
termination of parental rights regardless of the parent’s ability to pay the requisite
costs. In considering the procedures due in a contested step-parent adoption, the
M. L. B. majority again focused on the substantial and irreparable injury to parents
who lose all rights to their children, as well as the potential for judicial error, in
holding that “decrees forever terminating parental rights” fall into “the category of
cases in which the State may not ~bolt the door to equal justice’” (p. 124). The
Court, however, did not balance the child’s potential interests against the parent’s
rights, and did not have before it the argument that delay — whether caused by the
appellate process or by other contingencies — unjustly prolongs the child’s
uncertainty about her fate.

The cases from Lassiter through M. L. B. establish the parameters of the rights
and presumptions that parents bring to termination proceedings. These constitutional protections for parents are critical, especially since the fact-finding stage of a
termination proceeding “pits the state directly against the parents” (Santosky v.
Kramer, 1982, p. 759). At this stage, the trial court’s task is limited to determining
whether “the natural parents are at fault.” This finding of “fault” is understood to be
a prerequisite for the conclusion that these particular “parents are unfit to raise their
own children.” Because it is assumed that children are generally best served by
remaining with their parents, and a finding of fault could lead to their permanent
removal from their parents’ care, courts presume that the interests of children
converge with the interests of parents at legal proceedings. This presumption
remains, even where the facts appear to clearly rebut it (Ross, 1996). In Santosky,
for example, the parents’ interests were viewed as converging with their children’s
despite the fact that one boy, who had been removed from his parents when he was
only three days old, was seven when the case was argued and had never lived with
his parents. Yet even on those facts, the Court preserved the legal fiction that
parents and child speak with one voice, insisting “until the State proves parental
unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous
termination of their natural relationship”; only after the State proves parental unfitness, are the interests of parent and child deemed to “diverge” (Santosky v. Kramer,
1982, p. 760).
The Supreme Court has expressed doubts about whether “the State constitutionally could terminate a parent’s rights without showing parental unfitness,” although
it has never directly confronted the question (Santosky, 1982, p. 760). In obiter
dicta, the Court opined that
[w]e have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended ‘[if] a State were
to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents
and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do
so was thought to be in the children’s best interest’ (Quilloin v. Walcott, 1978, p. 255).

Notwithstanding the due process protections accorded the liberty interest of biological parents in their children, once a child enters foster care the parental rights
and responsibilities for that child are apportioned among biological parent, foster
parent and the state. The manner of this division resembles nothing so much as the
proverbial bundle of sticks well known in introductory law school property classes
reminding us of the long common law history of treating children as property. The
bundle of sticks analogy clarifies the notion that the rights associated with ownership of property can be “unbundled or disaggregated.” If the property is a bundle of
sticks, the owner may give away one or more sticks while retaining the balance of
the bundle. The sticks may represent temporary interests such as a particular usage
or a term of years. As one commentator explains, a “particular piece of property
may have multiple owners of different sticks in the bundle of rights that comprises
full ownership. When we are asked to determine who owns a particular stick in the

bundle, it may not help us to know who the ‘owner’ of the land is because ownership of various sticks in the bundle may be spread among several people” (Singer,
2001, pp. 2—3). Similarly, no matter how long a child remains in foster care, he or
she continues to “belong” to the natural parent in some respects. That natural parent
— although stripped of custody and day-to-day decision making once a child enters
foster care — retains the sole ability to make decisions regarding surgery and the
right to marry or enlist in the armed forces as a minor, among other decisions, and is
presumed to represent the child’s legal interests, retaining what amounts to a future
interest in the child (Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and
Reform (OFFER), 1977).
The Supreme Court made it clear in Santosky that there is no room at the factfinding stage of a termination proceeding to weigh either the child’s independent
interest or the child’s relationship with a foster family against the rights of the
natural parents in the care, custody and nurture of their child. The focus during factfinding at a termination proceeding is “emphatically” not on the child, or the other
opportunities open to the child, but only on whether “the natural parents are at
fault” as the state alleges (Smith v. OFFER, 1977, p. 759). Even when the child
demonstrates disinterest in the natural parents or positive attachment to current
caregivers such as foster parents there is no room for the child’s perspective until
the court turns to disposition. Some commentators have criticized this legal regime
for blocking a judge’s ability to consider the child’s need for protection and safety
outside the context of parental fault (Bartholet, 1999; Gelles & Schwartz, 1999).
Similarly, lower courts have expressly held that while the best interests of the
child should be paramount in all proceedings to terminate parental rights, “a court
may not base termination of parental rights solely on the best interests of a child”
(In re Welfare of M. H., 1999, p. 228; Meyer, 1999). In order to terminate parental
rights, a court must first find that at least one statutory ground for termination
exists. Consistent with the discussion in Santosky, state laws governing termination
provide for a bifurcated analysis. First, the court must ask whether sufficient
statutory grounds have been shown for terminating the parent’s rights (with due
consideration to the parent’s constitutional rights). Only then may the court reach
the second question: whether termination of parental rights in fact serves the child’s
best interest (e.g. Minn. Stat., 2003). If the statutory grounds for termination have
been well framed and the evidence that those grounds have been met is clear and
convincing, the child’s best interests will normally be served by termination, particularly if the state has already identified a permanent or adoptive home for the
child.
In a hypothetical regime in which the child’s rights were weighed heavily, fewer
children would be needlessly separated from their parents either temporarily or
permanently. Fewer would be removed from borderline domestic situations, and
fewer of those removed would spend fifteen months or more in foster care or fail to
ever find a new permanent home. In that hypothetical regime, children’s
attachments would also weigh in the decision to terminate parental rights. But in the

real world, things are not so simple.
Young children are not autonomous persons. The law recognizes that children
need adults to nurture and supervise them (Minow, 1990; Woodhouse, 1993). The
parental rights doctrine is premised in part on this notion, and the child welfare
system is in turn based upon the view that if the biological parents prove unfit for
the job of raising their children, the state has a compelling interest in replacing the
failed parent with one who is up to the challenge. The state’s interest in the healthy
development of its youngest citizens is deemed to allow the state to substitute itself
and its representatives as the anointed spokespersons for the children in lieu of unfit
biological parents. Children’s rights advocates emphasize the importance of being
able to distinguish when a child’s interests converge with the parent’s, and when it
is imperative to recognize that the needs or interests of parent and child
substantially diverge (Ross, 1996, 1999a, b). In the context of the child welfare
system, it may be inappropriate to assume that the child’s needs are fully
represented by the parent’s legal claims. At the same time, it oversimplifies matters
to presume that the interests of a child in foster care are irretrievably at odds with
those of his or her parents. Instead, to do justice to the potentially competing claims
of mothers and children in the child welfare system, we need to struggle to find a
way to hear the voice of the individual child. While the voices of children of various
ages may be treated differently because the balance of dependency and autonomy
shifts during the process of maturation, even very young children may have ways of
communicating about their needs (Ross, 1999a, b).
However, once the law has assigned the designation of “parent~~ to a particular
adult, parental rights doctrine as interpreted by Santosky dictates that the child has
no voice separate from the parent in court until grounds for termination are
established. Because of the importance of parental rights doctrine, courts will not
normally substitute the child’s best interest for an analysis of parental fault. Courts
frequently decline to weigh the unique circumstances of a child’s life, even where
they suggest that the child’s emotional well-being would be served by taking into
consideration factors other than parental fault, such as the child’s attachment to
caretakers.
This was the issue in the case of “Baby Jessica” DeBoer, who was wrongfully
adopted at the age of 17 days, even though her father’s rights had not been terminated. She was two years old and had known no parents other than her adoptive
mother and father when Justice Stevens refused to stay the lower court’s order
returning her to her natural parents (DeBoer v. DeBoer, 1993). Justice Stevens
explained that no law “authorizes unrelated persons to retain custody of a child
whose natural parents have not been found to be unfit, simply because they may be
better able to provide for her” (p. 1302).
In the similar and equally controversial case of “Baby Richard,” the father only
discovered that Richard was alive 57 days after the birth, well after Richard had
been adopted (In re Petition of Doe, 1994). Ruling that the father’s rights had been
terminated improperly, the Illinois Supreme Court held that courts may not consider

the best interests of the child before determining, as a threshold matter, that parental
rights should be terminated. If they could, the court opined, “few parents would be
secure in the custody of their own children” (p. 183). The corollary of this principle
is that every child should be secure in her parents’ custody. Thus the issue in both
cases, decided in the context of private adoption rather than of the child welfare
system, was a profound disagreement between advocates for the children and the
birth fathers over whether to define “parents” based on biology or on the child’s
emotional experience (Goldstein et al., 1996).

2. THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT OF 1997
The pendulum of child welfare reform has repeatedly swung between efforts to
preserve troubled families at virtually all costs and a passion to rescue every child in
need. At the height of a prevailing but oversimplified interpretation of family
preservation in the mid- 1990s, about half-a-million children were in foster care
because they had been “rescued” and were waiting for their parents to be rehabilitated so that they could return home. In many of these situations, the facts made
clear that the faster children were unlikely ever to rejoin their biological parents.
Although foster care was designed as a temporary expedient and was administered
as if it were in fact temporary, increasing numbers of children were spending three
years or more in foster care, many of them in a series of homes. This phenomenon
became known as “foster care drift” (H. R., 1997, p. 2740). About one-third of the
children in foster care would never return home. (Duquette & Hardin, 1999).
Instead, many of these children grew up in a series of foster homes and institutions,
languishing for years in a child welfare system that moved at a “glacial pace”
(Gordon. 1999, p. 649). At the same time, publicity focused awareness on several
egregious cases of children who had been returned to their families, only to die at
the hands of a parent.
Eventually, the increasingly widespread perception that the foster care system
was out of control and hurting children led to a congressional search for uniform
solutions based on the child’s need for safety, nurturance and permanency (Gendell,
2001). ASFA, enacted with overwhelming bipartisan support, proclaimed “two
basic goals: [p]reventing children from being returned to unsafe homes, and finding
safe and loving and permanent homes for children who cannot be reunited with
their families” (143 Cong. Rec. H2017, 1997).
Like other child welfare reform efforts since the 1970s, ASFA drew heavily on
the child development principles set forth in the influential work of Joseph
Goldstein, Albert Solnit, and Anna Freud (Gordon, 1999). These principles include
consideration of: (1) the child’s need for parental continuity — an adult who serves
as the child’s “psychological parent”; (2) the importance of instilling in the child the
feeling of being safe, protected and loved; and (3) the child’s compressed sense of

time and the concomitant urgency of resolution (Goldstein et al., 1996). Above all,
the leading interpreters of ASFA called on those charged with applying the law to
look at the foster care system “through the eyes of the child” (Duquette & Hardin,
1999, p. 1-7).
ASFA’s proponents urged careful consideration of the child’s perspective
because they were aware that the interests of parents and children do not always
mesh (Gordon, 1999). Several members of Congress expressly stated that the
balance between children’s and parents’ rights had to shift under ASFA. As one
commentator has noted, putting children first is “often ‘difficult and painful.’ It is
difficult because adults do not have children’s needs and cannot easily see what
they are. It is painful because what is good for children may be unfair to adults”
(Gordon, 1999, p. 657). Congress made clear that where it was not possible to be
equally “fair” to children and their parents, ASFA requires courts to elevate the
interests of the child over those of the parent.
The effort to focus on children’s needs was embodied in the Act’s key provision,
which provides that in order to retain federal funding, the state “shall” move to
terminate parental rights with the goal of adoption or another form of permanent
placement in two categories of cases: (I) cases where it is apparent early on that the
child cannot safely return home because of “aggravated circumstances,” such as
torture or a felony assault; and (2) all cases involving children who “have been in
foster care under the responsibility of the State for 15 of the most recent 22 months”
(the “15/22 months rule”). In legal parlance, “shall” means that the directive is
mandatory. The statute provides only three exceptions to the requirement that the
state initiate termination proceedings. The 15-month deadline does not apply when:
(1) the child is in kinship foster care; (2) the state can demonstrate to the court a
“compelling reason” why such a petition would not serve the child’s best interests;
or (3) the state has failed to provide the services which its own case plan “deems
necessary for the safe return of the child to the child’s home.”
Generally, the aggravated circumstances cases are not complex in terms of either
law or morality. The facts of those cases are so heinous that line-drawing should not
prove difficult. In cases involving “aggravated circumstances” the parent has
already put the child’s life at risk. In contrast, the cases in the second group are not
so straightforward. With the passage of time, termination becomes more and more
likely, and the needs all children have for stability and permanence are pitted
directly against the claims of their parents. ASFA establishes a presumption that,
after 15 months have passed, all children are better off if their parental rights are
terminated.
In many, or even most instances, ASFA’s reforms promote the actual needs of
the individual child. Unfortunately, the complexities of child welfare cases are not
always amenable to such an easy categorical fix, as will be demonstrated in Section
3. As a result, if states consistently apply the statute as written, ASFA may
unwittingly place the claims of the state in conflict with the demonstrable needs of
at least some fraction of children.

In addition to enunciating the “15/22 months” legal rule, the Act imposes
specific accelerated time lines for court proceedings designed to guarantee the child
a permanent placement, whether with the natural parents or somewhere else. ASFA
thus requires that a court conduct a permanency hearing “no later than 12 months
after the date the child is considered to have entered foster care.” This section of
ASFA squarely raises the question raised in Santosky and left unanswered by the
Supreme Court for 35 years: is the passage of time sufficient to establish a level of
parental “fault” that satisfies the due process clause for the purposes of irrevocably
terminating a mother’s right to her child?
The remaining sections of this article consider the interplay between the time line
and the respective rights of parents and children — rights that can either be
mutually reinforcing, or may stand in direct conflict.

2.1. The Mere Passage of Time
Federal law creates an implicit presumption that a parent who allows a child to
linger in foster care for 15 months is unfit. By virtue of this assumption, in an effort
to place the child’s presumptive interests front and center, the Act sidestepped the
essential legal question of how the state would establish legally sustainable grounds
for termination in light of the court’s obligation to consider the rights of the parent
in their child.
By the end of 1999, every state and the District of Columbia had amended local
statutes in an effort to comply generally with ASFA (U.S. Gen. Accounting Office
(G.A.O.), 1999). Illinois reconciled the standard of “unfitness” with the 15/22
months rule by revising its statutes to provide, in part, that a parent may be found
unfit if, pursuant to a court order, “a child has been in foster care for 15 months out
of any 22 month period” (750 Ill. Comp. Stat., 1998). in re H. G. (2001), the only
reported case to date considering the due process implications of the 15/22 months
rule, the Illinois Supreme Court overturned the section of the state’s Adoption Act
creating this new ground of parental unfitness based on the length of time a child
has remained in foster care.
As summarized by the court, the facts of the case are not atypical. Illinois
removed H. G. from her mother’s custody in March of 1996 because of neglect. The
state alleged that the mother had violated a protective order by allowing H. G. to see
her father, and had grabbed H. G.’s arm on two occasions, causing it to dislocate. H.
G. entered foster care. Nine months later, in December of 1996, the court placed H.
G. in the legal custody of the state and ordered the mother to participate in a variety
of services, including obtaining appropriate housing, participating in therapy, and
completing parenting classes. The record offers no indication of the relationship
between the mother’s housing and the allegations of neglect, nor does it indicate
what services, if any, the state offered the mother in any of these three areas.
In August 1998, 20 months after the trial court’s dispositional order and 29

months (or two and a half years) after H. G. was removed from her home, the state
filed a petition for termination of the mother’s rights. The petition alleged that the
mother was unfit because she had failed either to make “reasonable efforts to
correct the conditions which were the basis for removal” or to make reasonable
progress toward reunification. Trial was originally scheduled for March, 1999, but
seven months of continuances, some initiated by the state, followed.
In October 1999, 14 months after the state filed its petition for termination, 34
months after the original disposition order, and 43 months after H. G. entered the
foster care system, the state filed an amended petition to terminate parental rights,
this time adding an allegation that the mother was unfit because H. G. had been in
foster care for 15 out of the preceding 22 months. Another series of continuances
postponed the trial date to the end of January 2000. By its own terms, ASFA (as
Illinois implemented it) failed H. G. dismally. When the termination hearing finally
began, she had been in foster care for more than three years, more than the average
length of time that children spent in foster care before ASFA became law.
H. G.’s mother challenged the statute on the grounds that it violated her due
process and equal protection rights because it is “not narrowly tailored to achieve its
manifest purpose, improperly shifts the burden of proof to a respondent parent, and
improperly invites consideration of best interest issues at the fitness portion of a
termination hearing$’ in violation of the holding in Santosky (In re H. G., 2001, p.
873). The trial court ruled for the mother on all three grounds, stating “[t]he
problem is inherent in that this particular statute, unlike all of the other provisions
for finding unfitness, relates not to conduct of a parent or an internal flaw of
character or behavior or mental illness or physical infirmity, but rather the mere
passage of time” (p. 868). The Illinois Supreme Court expressly rejected the state’s
argument that “a fit parent does not allow his or her child to languish in foster care
for 15 months” (p. 871). The court correctly pointed out that the case before it
“aptly illustrate[s]” that, “in many cases, the length of a child’s stay in foster care
has nothing to do with the parent’s ability or inability to safely care for the child
but, instead, is due to circumstances beyond the parent’s control” (p. 872). It
continued,
[because there will be many cases in which children remain in foster care for the
statutory period even when their parents can properly care for them.., the presumption
contained in [the statute] is not a narrowly tailored means of identifying parents who
pose a danger to their children’s health or safety (p. 873).

In summary, the court stated, “[wie decline to recognize that the State has a
compelling interest in removing children from foster care in an expeditious fashion
when that removal is achieved in an unconstitutional manner” (p. 874).
Clarity about legal standards and zealous protection of procedural rights is particularly important in termination cases because a profound imbalance of power
permeates the relationship between a mother and the state. This imbalance not only
dominates the day-to-day dealings of the parties, it also allows the state to play a

large role in crafting the record that a court ultimately reviews in most, if not all,
cases. As the Supreme Court has observed, because “the child is already in agency
custody” in most termination proceedings “the State even has the power to shape
the historical events that form the basis for termination,” thus increasing the risk of
erroneous fact-finding (Santosky v. Kramer, 1982, p. 763).
If the agency drags its feet and fails to provide the parent with needed resources
and support, fifteen months are likely to be consumed without any discernable
change in the parent’s circumstances. In addition, while the mother often lacks legal
representation during much, if not all of the process, the child welfare agency is
represented by counsel from the inception of its relationship with the mother.
Because she lacks legal representation, the mother may be intimidated, inarticulate
or confused. Consequently, she may “consent” to a course of action from which it is
hard to extricate herself (such as “voluntary” placement under threat of coerced
removal of her children). Equally important, caseworkers keep written records of
the mother’s attitude, behavior and compliance, all of which can be introduced as
evidence at a termination hearing. Because the caseworker has significant leeway to
describe the mother as he or she sees fit in those records, the caseworker wields
enormous power. In addition, it may prove difficult or impossible to correct even
factual errors in the record (Lassiter v. Dep ‘t of Social Services, 1981) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). As one federal judge concluded, “the damage to constitutional rights
is accomplished in the many months preceding the opportunity for final judicial
disposition” (Nicholson v. Williams, 2002, p. 215). The mutual interests of a mother
and child who should be reunited can be compromised by the state’s incompetence
and its control of the narrative presented to the court at the end of 15 months.
But the child is also at risk when the state simply ignores the federal requirement
that it act in timely fashion. Preliminary reports suggest that many states are failing
to move to terminate when a child has been in foster care for 15 out of the last 22
months (G.A.O., 2002). Even when states seek termination on the ground that too
much time has passed, courts may refuse to grant the state’s petition because the
state has failed to set forth legally cognizable grounds. The extent of noncompliance
is unknown, in large part because the federal government does not collect data on
how often states use the 15/22 month rule to trigger a termination proceeding.
Sparse data from a handful of states suggests that the rule focuses state agencies on
the passage of time, but that it has not changed agency protocol. Officials report that
they fail to seek termination after 15 months as required under ASFA for a variety
of reasons, including a shortage of viable permanent homes for the children.
Anecdotal reports suggest that state agencies simply fail to file for termination
rather than triggering one of the statutory exemptions by demonstrating to a court
that “compelling reasons” exist not to seek termination.
However, the suspicion that agencies or judges may not enforce the 15/22 month
rule does not diminish the urgency of the doctrinal questions presented by ASFA’s
mandatory time line. If states are to comply with ASFA, they will need to draft
statutes that offerjudges constitutionally sound rationales for terminating a parent’s

rights after 15 months.

2.2. Three Statutory Models
Despite the clear risks to children that accumulate with the length of time in the
child welfare system, less than one-third of all states have even attempted to craft a
statutory rationale for terminating parental rights (absent other statutory grounds for
termination) after a child has been in foster care for 15 of the preceding 22 months.
In many states, the reference to 15/22 months (or, in some instances, a shorter
period) is found only in the section on definitions, or in the section on when a
termination petition should be filed, and the passage of time is not addressed in the
portion of the code that spells out the grounds for terminating parental rights. A
handful of states do not appear to have incorporated any reference to the 15/22
month period set forth in ASFA in their legal code. These include Florida, Hawaii,
Michigan, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Vermont.
The states that have tackled the drafting problem so far have tended to use one of
three approaches: (1) the prima facie case;1 (2) the rebuttable legal presumption or
“res ipse loquitur” approach;2 and (3) the “predictive” approach, based on
evaluations of future parental capacity and behavior.
The first approach (which I call the “prima facie case”), exemplified by the
statute overturned in Illinois and a similar (as-yet untested) provision in South
Carolina (S.C. Code Ann., 1998) makes the placement of a child in foster care for
15 out of 22 months prima facie proof of parental unfitness and thus an independent
ground for termination. The surface advantage of this approach is obvious. It
enables lawmakers and judges to circumvent the logjam at the heart of ASFA which
is created by the conflict between two legal principles: placing the child’s best
interests first, on the one hand, and the constitutional imperative not to disrupt the
parent-child relationship unless strict legal standards have been satisfied, on the
other.
The second approach (which I call the “res ipse loquitur” approach) is similar,
but allows some flexibility. Under this regime, if a child has been in foster care for
15 of the preceding 22 months, the law establishes a presumption that the best
interests of the child will be served by termination of parental rights (e.g. Mont.
Code Ann., 2001). This resembles the approach in tort law that under certain
conditions, if one party has been injured (the child) then another party (the parent)
must have been negligent, and thus blameworthy. The presumption is that
remaining in foster care for 15 out of 22 months causes injury to the child and this
serves as evidence of unfitness, because a fit parent would have regained custody of
the child in that period of time. Whatever the initial harm to the child may have
been, this formulation makes the child’s continuing presence in foster care an ongoing harm attributable to the parent rather than to the state. The res ipse loquitur
approach makes a useful conceptual contribution. It helps to focus the court’s

attention on the harms the child has experienced both in the parent’s custody and as
a consequence of the child’s prolonged stay in foster care. The shift in emphasis
from the rights of the parent to the needs of the child is exactly what ASFA
intended.
But even though the res ipse loquitur presumption is expressly or implicitly
rebuttable, it shares some of the infirmities found in the Illinois law at issue in H. G.
Once the plaintiff (the child, represented by the state) has established by
circumstantial evidence that reasonable persons could conclude that the injury was
caused by parental negligence, the parents’ defense relies on a strong showing of an
alternative explanation, which the parents may not be able to establish (Keeton etal.,
1984).
The third, and most promising, approach requires that the court predict the
likelihood that the parent will be a fit or unfit parent for this child in the near future.
The statutes that adopt a predictive approach require the court to evaluate both the
extent to which the state has provided the parent with rehabilitative programs and
other opportunities to meet the state’s demands, and the parent’s efforts to address
the state’s concerns while the child has been in foster care. In Connecticut, for
example, the statute expressly provides a ground for termination where the child has
been in the custody of the state for 15 of the 22 preceding months and
the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the
child to the parent.., and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would
encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child,
such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child (Conn. Gen. Stat., 2003).

The statute reins in judicial discretion by requiring that in all cases where parents
oppose termination of their rights, the trial court shall make written findings
regarding seven factors: (1) the services offered to the parent; (2) the extent to
which the state and the parents fulfilled the terms of any applicable court order; (3)
the child’s significant emotional ties with the parents or any other guardian in
whose care the child has been for at least twelve months; (4) the child’s age; (5) the
parent’s efforts to address the conditions which led to the child’s removal; (6) the
parent’s visitation with the child while the child was in out-of-home placement; and
(7) the extent, if any, to which the parent’s effort to maintain a relationship with the
child were constrained by unreasonable acts on the part of any other person or by
the parent’s economic circumstances. This standard respects the parents’ rights to a
meaningful opportunity to regain their children. At the same time, it allows the
court to take the child’s sense of the passage of time into account, and to weigh it
heavily against the parent’s plea for more time to attempt rehabilitation. The
approach is premised on the view that children cannot tolerate prolonged delay
while their parents relapse into harmful behavior. As one trial court put it, “children
cannot afford to spend the rest of their childhood waiting for their father and mother
to also grow up” (State Dep ‘t of Human Resources v. A. K., 2002, p. 9).
The child’s age is a particularly important factor because it affects the child’s

sense of time, as well as the depth of the relationship between the child and the
biological parent and the child’s memory of that relationship. The infant placed at
birth will obviously have no experience with her biological mother, and may have a
well-developed relationship with a foster family, while the 14-year-old may have
positive feelings toward her mother, and regard the foster family as a recent
intrusion. Equally important, if the state terminates the biological mother’s parental
rights to a 14-year-old, she is likely to become a “legal orphan,” a child who is
legally free for adoption but for whom the state cannot find an adoptive home
(Guggenheim, 1995). Many adolescents who graduate from foster care turn to their
biological families for support. If the parental rights of the biological parent have
been terminated, legal services lawyers report, teenagers “often come back and say
to us, ‘You know, I want that termination vacated because I want to have a
connection with my biological family”’ (Drinane, 2000, p. 444). But ASFA does
not distinguish between infants and teenagers in mandating termination after 15
months.
Courts also face the limitations of the case record in determining parental “fault”
and in attempting to predict whether a child can be safe with that parent in the
future. According to the American Psychological Association, specific evidence of
past behavior is the best basis for prediction of future behavior (Gerbasi et al.,
2000). Records in termination cases are replete with evidence of past behavior on
which to premise predictions of future parenting behavior. There is, however, no
easy checklist that agencies and courts can rely upon in their effort to predict
whether a child can be safe with his or her parents. As psychologists explain,
“[e]ach case is unique, often involving complex and confusing facts, and the stakes
— the safety and welfare of a child — are very high” (Freitag & Wordes, 2001).
A modification of the predictive approach emphasizes the extent to which prediction is based on past acts for which the parent may equitably be held responsible.
In Minnesota, for example, the statute provides for termination of parental rights on
the grounds that the child “is neglected and in foster care” (Minn. Stat., 2003). This
ground for termination applies to children who have been placed in foster care by
court order, who cannot currently be returned to their parents, and “whose parents,
despite the availability of needed rehabilitative services, have failed to make
reasonable efforts to adjust their circumstances, condition or conduct....” The court
is directed to make findings regarding how long the child has been in foster care, as
well as about the parent’s efforts to rehabilitate and to maintain contact with the
child, and whether the state offered reasonable services to the parent. The last two
factors attempt to focus the court on parental behavior while the child has been in
foster care rather than on the mere passage of time.
In contrast to Minnesota’s adaptation, ASFA sidesteps the relationship between
the passage of 15 months in foster care and the constitutional imperative that the
state must establish parental fault. In circumventing the constitutional requirement
that the state prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence before
terminating parental rights, the law does a disservice to both parents and children.

Children who have been in foster care for fifteen months or more, who are not
likely to return home safely in the near future, and for whom a permanent home has
been identified should be able to take advantage of ASFA and be legally adopted
and integrated into new families. But if the state fails to come to grips with its
burden to prove parental unfitness, it may wrongfully deprive parents and children
of a legally protected relationship that is beneficial to the children and unwittingly
subject such children to continuing uncertainty in the form of a lengthy appeals
process.
In order for ASFA’s 15/22 month provision to survive wider appellate scrutiny,
the state (including both the child welfare and court systems) bears the onus of
keeping each case on schedule in accordance with the statute’s time lines and of
insuring that parents receive the services they need. If the state were to accomplish
these goals, any efforts to terminate parental rights in neglect cases would
necessarily be based on allegations of persistent unfitness despite opportunities to
change and not merely the passage of time. The burden on the state promotes the
child’s legal and developmental interests as well as the parent’s rights because the
child may not be well served by an unnecessary permanent separation from a parent
whom the child regards as his or her primary caretaker.
In addition to the individual children whose unique histories indicate that they
should not be severed from their parents, there are identifiable and predictable subclasses of children who should not be permanently separated from their mothers
based solely on the clock running out at fifteen months. Examples of these
circumstances are the focus of the next section.

3. “BAD” MOTHERS: HARD CATEGORIES,
HARDER CASES
When the abusive or neglectful parent who asserts a liberty interest and the
concomitant procedural protections is a mother, an additional array of issues
emerges. These include problematic, essentialist definitions of “woman” and
“mother” that are loaded with normative assumptions. Essentialism refers to the
notion that all women share a common experience or nature, and are characterized
by common attributes and that those who fail to live up to the ideal are flawed as
women (Chamallas, 2003). To be a woman is to be a current, past or potential
mother, regardless of individual choice or actual condition (Fineman, 1995). To be
a mother is normatively to be a “good” mother, so that the adjective need not even
be stated. A “mother” by default is the normative mother, a socially constructed
image that encapsulates many presumptions — especially those of a woman who is
middle-class, married, and a caretaker. In this view, only the unusual, deviant
mother requires a prefatory adjective: “single,” “working,” “welfare,” or “bad.” In
reality, as some feminist scholars have pointed out, an infinite variety of women

and mothers exist (Murphy, 1998; Williams, 2000). Reported opinions in
proceedings to terminate parental rights offer an enormous range of portraits of
mothers. Women who have abused, neglected, or failed to protect their children
may be single, married, cohabiting or divorced.
Despite the ease with which we can locate these mothers in the real world, for a
long time feminist theory “largely ignored ‘bad mothers’ and their implications for
child abuse” (Ashe & Cahn, 1993, p. 76). This silence may reflect a defensive
mechanism exercised by feminists in legal practice either because they are reluctant
to believe that their clients had “beaten, struck, or kicked their children,” or because
those realities are so difficult to “understand or interpret” (Ashe & Cahn, 1993, pp.
79, 109). Feminist scholars in turn skirted the issue because the facts did not mesh
with an early feminist meta-narrative of women as victims (Woodhouse, 1999).
Recently, however, feminist scholars have increasingly recognized that “women are
not only victims.., they are often guilty themselves as agents who abuse children or
fail to protect them” (Becker, 1995, p. 13).
Women may abuse power and fail to protect their children in two distinguishable
ways (Becker, 1995). In the first, the woman herself is the agent of aggressive or
passive acts that harm her children. In the second, the woman’s liability stems from
her failure to protect her children from abuse or neglect at the hands of third party.
In this second category, feminist theory suggests the importance of clearly
distinguishing the acts and omissions attributable to the mother from those of the
primary source of the harm (commonly the child’s father or the mother’s male
companion). Just as feminist scholars have highlighted the injustices wrought by the
traditional legal presumption that a man and his wife were a single legal unit for
purposes of spousal violence (Anderson, 2003), SO too must contemporary courts
learn to distinguish when mothers can and cannot be held accountable for the
actions of the men in their lives. Women who know that a particular person
threatens their child’s safety and nevertheless fail to protect the child from
predictable or on-going harm, however, transform themselves into agents of abuse.
For example, it is widely understood that the mother who refuses to leave a man
who she learns is sexually abusing her daughter is not a safe custodian for that child
(Appell, 1999; Venier, 2000).
The context in which events occur and individuals make decisions is frequently
overlooked in child welfare decision-making even though it is transparently clear
that some mothers cannot muster the resources to protect their children without
help. One of the major insights of contemporary feminism is particularly apt with
reference to the child welfare system: it is necessary to deconstruct the gender and
class neutrality of laws in order to reveal alternative accounts of power and reality
(Smart, 1989). In context, victimization and social structures contribute to the
determination of which women regain their children from the child welfare system
and which women lose them forever. Extreme poverty in the face of a lack of
services, single parenthood and race all contribute to both initial intervention and
ultimate removal of children (Pelton, 1998; Ramsey, 2003). For this reason, ASFA

envisions preventive services that are adequate to eliminate unnecessary removals.
Current federal law retains the prevention and reunification provisions that were
enacted as part of the Child Welfare Act of 1980. ASFA modifies the “reasonable
efforts” provisions of the 1980 Act by providing that some small proportion of
children have been hurt so badly, and some parents are so clearly incapable of
transformation, that in those cases, time and resources should not be wasted on
fruitless efforts that disserve children who will never go home. In order to move
those children into new permanent homes more swiftly, ASFA defines the “aggravated circumstances” which eliminate the requirement that the state make “reasonable efforts” to preserve the family. In all other instances, ASFA as integrated
with pre-existing laws requires that “reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve
and reunify families.” “Reasonable efforts” include providing services that would
“prevent or eliminate the need for removing the child from the child’s home,” as
well as services following removal “to make it possible for a child to safely return
to the child’s home” (Child Welfare Act of 1980).
Consistent with its vision of termination after a child has remained in foster care
for 15 months, however, ASFA specifies that the state is no longer obligated to
provide services to the family after the expiration of the 15 month period. By
allowing the state to curtail services for the mother after a child has been in foster
care for 15 months (regardless of when the mother actually began to receive the
services), ASFA may exacerbate the constitutional infirmities of the 15/22 months
rule as viewed from the perspective of the parent’s rights. Some states do not even
wait 15 months before cutting off services. Utah, for example, will not provide
reunification services for more than one year for children over three years of age,
and makes services available for only eight months where children under age three
are involved (Utah Code Ann., 2003).
Persistent complaints about the lack of funding for preventive services support
the view that poverty continues to provoke the separation of children and parents
(Ramsey, 2003). The label of neglectful parent is skewed by class, race, culture and
ethnicity from the point of reporting and investigation through removal and
termination (Bartholet, 1999; Roberts, 2002; Ross &Cahn, 2000). Totheextentthat
child welfare agencies or courts view some mothers as neglectful based primarily
on cultural differences or poverty, a family’s failure to conform to an idealized
notion of middle class life does not constitute a legitimate basis for removing a
child.
For example, Adriana Recodo escaped from an abusive domestic relationship but
had no income, no place to live and no transportation. When she sought help from a
social worker, she received a referral to a psychologist and her son entered foster
care. Recodo was studying for her G.E.D. and seeking employment. She could not
find stable housing, but the state did not provide her with housing assistance. Her
parental rights were terminated due to “chronic instability” in her employment and
housing (Recodo v. State, 1997). When the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the
termination, a pointed dissent put Recodo’s case in the context of other termination

cases that had reached the state’s highest court, concluding that “the State’s modus
operandi appears to be to go into the homes of handicapped, powerless and usually
very poor parents, remove their children.., and put the children into the home of
substitute parents who are more affluent than the natural parents and more pleasing
to social service agents than the natural parents” (p. 1136).
Yet the relationship between poverty and entrance into foster care should not be
surprising. It is inseparable from our society’s public expectations and legal norms
concerning the privatization of caretaking (Fineman, 1999). The denial of collective
responsibility for caretaking in favor of norms that emphasize autonomy and selfreliance deprives caretakers of the social, financial and government support that
many of them desperately need (Fineman, 1998). The institution of foster care itself
may be understood as a substitution of one private caretaking unit for another, albeit
with a small government subsidy (Ross & Cahn, 2000). The children of neglectful
parents would benefit greatly from a more sensitive filtering system, in which
neglect that does not result in serious harm or danger would trigger benefits in the
form of services, rather than potentially unwarranted removal (Goldstein et al.,
1997).
Poverty can also interfere with a parent’s ability to reclaim children who have
entered foster care. In New York City, for example, public interest lawyers report
that the shortage of available apartments for low income parents means that a
significant number of parents remain separated from their children solely because
they lack adequate housing (Kaufman, 2004). While children are in foster care they
do not count as members of their mother’s household. The mother does not receive
public benefits which she might otherwise get, and cannot claim that the children
live with her when she applies for a larger apartment in subsidized housing. The
mother finds herself in a closed system where she cannot regain her children unless
she has enough space, and she cannot get enough space unless she has possession of
her children.
A range of other problems common to parents whose children enter foster care,
such as substance abuse, imprisonment, and domestic violence, are not amenable to
speedy resolution. Under ASFA, each of these problems might form the basis for
termination of a mother’s rights as soon as the fifteen month period expires, even if
the child could potentially be kept safe in the home with sufficient services. Some
children whose mothers have such problems might be better served by preservation
of the parental bond than by termination. An individualized determination of the
child’s best interests would weigh such factors as the child’s age, the specific nature
of the mother-child relationship, demonstrated harm to the child, and the identified
placement alternatives. Because ASFA imposes a categorical imperative that
parental rights be terminated after the passage of a certain amount of time, it does
not appear to permit the exercise of judicial discretion in response to the best
interests of those children who would be better off retaining a legal relationship
with their mothers (G.A.O., 2002).

3.1. Substance Abuse
Substance abuse is highly correlated with child neglect and abuse. When Congress
adopted ASFA, it noted that, along with poverty, substance abuse is “one of the
three most common reasons for children entering foster care” (H. R., 1997, p. 19). It
estimated that substance abuse occurs in “up to 80% of substantiated abuse and
neglect cases.” Both alcohol dependency and regular use of illegal substances show
a high correlation with child neglect~ although direct causation has not been
demonstrated (Egami, 1996). The General Accounting Office reports that most
children in foster care have at least one parent who abuses one or more illegal drugs
such as cocaine, methamphetamnines or heroin, and most parents who use illegal
substances have done so for five years or more, suggesting that they will not be
readily amenable to rehabilitation (G.A.O., 1998).
The common relationship between the removal of children from their homes and
a variety of biases involving race, class and other norms, noted above, may also be
implicated in child welfare cases involving substance abuse (Roberts, 2002; Ross, 1
999a, b). It is, however, misguided to ignore the pernicious effects that parental
substance abuse may have on children, regardless of the precise substance of choice
(Bartholet, 1999). Substance abuse can alter judgment, diminish impulse control,
and stimulate aggression. At the core of the problem, substance abuse may make it
impossible for a parent to perceive — much less respond to — a child’s needs. The
inability to perceive the world around her accurately often interferes with the
parent’s ability to minister to the child’s most basic needs. As one teenager
reflected, looking back on a substance-abusing mother, “I realize that drugs were
more important than me, that I didn’t come first in my mother’s life. She wasn’t
worried about if I ate or where I slept — she was more worried about drugs”
(National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA), 1999, p. 18). Another
teen summarized her experience with a substance-abusing mother, saying, “She was
always off doin’ her own thing. She wasn’t even really a mom” (CASA, 1999, p.
16).
For purposes of this discussion, it is not necessary to enter into the debate over
whether substance abuse has its genesis in illness, is a rational response to stress, or
results from moral failings. From the perspective of the ASFA timeline, the critical
issue is that “parents are frequently ordered to undergo drug treatment or other
counseling as a condition to regaining custody of a child in foster care. Given the
realities of limited funding, it is not uncommon for there to be waiting lists to
receive such services” (In re H. G., 2001, p. 872). Thirty-nine of the 46 states that
responded to a recent federal survey reported that they lacked sufficient drug
treatment programs (G.A.O., 1998). The dearth of services is even more
pronounced for women than for men (H. H. 5., 1999). Social workers report that
many women feel trapped — they fear that if they voluntarily enter a treatment
program, they run the risk that their children will be removed from them and placed

in foster care (CASA, 1999). Policies that result in forced separation of children
from mothers who enter treatment programs run counter to research suggesting that
mothers who are able to keep their children while in treatment are more likely to
complete treatment successfully (Friedland, 2000).
Even where services are available, substance abusers often require several
courses of treatment before they stop relapsing (and some never succeed in breaking
the cycle of addiction or significantly improve their ability to function) (Denzin,
1987). From the vantage point of a mother’s parental rights, this suggests that when
the state removes children because of neglect stemming from a mother’s substance
abuse, the 15-month clock is likely to run before a mother can establish that she has
successfully completed treatment. The running of the clock is of equal concern from
the child’s point of view if it means that the child loses the chance to have a sound
relationship with a parent because timely, comprehensive treatment is not available
for that parent.
The likelihood that a mother will regain custody of a child who has entered the
child welfare system is further diminished if the mother is incarcerated as a result of
her abuse of illegal substances. As many as 80% of incarcerated women are
mothers, and most of those are single mothers (Downey, 2001). Nearly two-thirds
of women in state prisons report that their children lived with them until they were
incarcerated (Mumola, 2000). If a woman is in prison because of drug related
offenses, the court may have been required to sentence her under mandatory
sentencing guidelines without discretion to consider the impact of the sentence on
her children. Such la?ws have an unintended disparate impact on mothers and
fathers. When men who live with their children enter prisons, over 90% report that
the children remain with the child’s other parent; only 1% of children of male
inmates enter foster care (Acoca & Raeder, 1998). In stark contrast, only 28% of
women prisoners report that their children are living with the children’s father
(Mumola, 2000). Although over half of the children of women prisoners live with
grandparents or other relatives, nearly 10% of women prisoners report that their
children have entered foster care — putting them at risk of termination of parental
rights since the average mother in a state prison is expected to remain there for 49
months (Mumola, 2000).
If applied mechanistically, the 15/22 months rule would be a death knell for the
parental rights of all parents with children in foster care who remain in jail for more
than a year and a half. Unfortunately, effective treatment programs for women
involved with the criminal justice system are virtually non-existent. From the
vantage point of the incarcerated mother who wishes to retain a relationship with
her child, the state’s reliance on the 15/22 months rule seems patently unfair. As
one women’s advocate explained, “[flor many inmates, children are a life-sustaining
force. To break that bond is a punishment of the worst kind” (Acoca & Raeder,
1999, p. 136). In order to avoid categorical severance of the parental rights of all
incarcerated women, courts could perform an individualized assessment. Such an
assessment could examine the mother’s fault and predict her future behavior by

looking at such factors as whether she has pursued opportunities for treatment,
cooperated with and completed services that were made available, relapsed and
tested positive for drugs, experienced further arrests, and whether she used every
available means to maintain contact with her child (such as writing letters, calling
and seeking visits). Under ASFA the incarcerated mother could permanently lose
her parental rights even if she made every feasible effort to rehabilitate herself,
communicate with her children or have them visit her in jail. This happened to a
Nevada woman who had no substance abuse problems and had provided a stable
home for her children for several years. She was serving a sentence for violating the
conditions of her parole on an old conviction for forging checks, after her boyfriend
turned her in to authorities for leaving the state without permission. The mother
fulfilled every condition of her case plan that could be accomplished while she was
in prison, maintained contact with her children and the child welfare agency, and
was scheduled to be released no later than 11 months after the trial court terminated
her rights. Fortunately, she was able to file an appeal, and the state’s highest court
restored her parental rights, which it found had been terminated “solely based ‘on
the passage of time’ “(In the Matter of J. L. N., 2002, p. 960). Other women are also
likely to find that the 15/22 months have expired while they remained in prison.
Even where courts insist that the state establish a ground for termination other
than the passage of time, incarceration is likely to contribute to termination under
more generalized theories of fault. Appellate courts in several states have expressly
held that termination may not be based solely on the parent’s incarceration. In most
instances, however, courts treat incarceration as a factor in determining whether the
parent will be able to resume parenting obligations, looking at “factors being related
to incarceration” rather than deciding to terminate parental rights based “solely” on
the fact of incarceration (In re Brettany M., 2002; In re Dependency of J. W, 1998;
in re P 0. M., 2002; In re R. P, 1993; In the Matter of J. L. N., 2002; Johnson v. Ark.
Dept. of Human Services, 2002).
Commentators have largely overlooked two recent changes to the federal law,
which courts are likely to erroneously view as “factors being related to incarceration” bearing on a mother’s ability to resume parenting responsibility. First, as part
of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) legislation (commonly
referred to as “welfare reform”), Congress “stipulated that persons convicted of a
state or federal felony offense involving the use or sale of drugs are subject to a
lifetime ban on receiving cash assistance and food stamps” (Allard, 2002, p. 1).
Forty-two states are enforcing the ban in full or in part and, although it applies only
to benefits for the mother, it is likely to diminish the household income of paroled
drug offenders significantly and result in the mother’s “neglect” of children who
have been returned to her.
In a second development, the federal government authorized local Public
Housing Authorities to obtain criminal records and to use information about drug
convictions to deny public housing to people who either have a conviction or are
“suspected of drug involvement” (Allard, 2002, p. 12). This provision not only bars

mothers convicted of drug offenses from obtaining public housing, it also means
that they cannot stay with relatives in public housing without subjecting their hosts
to the risk of eviction. The combined blow of a lifetime ban on welfare benefits and
lack of access to public housing severely diminishes the prospect that a mother
newly released from prison will be able to convince authorities that she can provide
a safe home for her children. Since ASFA provides that the state does not have to
engage in “reasonable efforts” after a child has been in foster care for 15 out of 22
months, the poverty often associated with a mother’s status as a drug offender may
be transformed into an unwarranted justification for permanently severing her from
her children.
In the absence of broader social reform, however, termination because a relationship has withered while a parent is in prison fulfills ASFA’s intention to require
the law to look at foster care through the child’s eyes. From the viewpoint of a
young child, it may not matter why her mother is unable to care for her. What
matters is that whatever stability she once had has been disrupted, her mother has
not been her primary psychological parent and, perhaps (if she is lucky), someone
else now occupies that place in her life.
Conflict between the needs of the child and the desires of the parent may be
brought to a head even before termination is an issue. The mother may have a right
to maintain her relationship with her child even while using drugs or incarcerated,
but the child may have an equally strong claim not to have contact with a parent if
such contact is more harmful than beneficial. Consider, for example, a young child
in a stable, pre-adoptive foster home about whom I was consulted. He has no
memory of either of his drug-addicted parents. One parent — who is still addicted
to crack — has vanished, and cannot be located by the child welfare agency. The
other parent, who is in prison on charges related to drugs and has not seen the child
for several years, requests that the agency bring the child for a visit and the agency
complies. As a result of contact with his virtually unknown parent in jail, the child
experiences severe developmental setbacks. These setbacks include rage, severe
enuresis, and other behavioral manifestations so pronounced that the foster parents
reconsider whether they want to adopt the boy, ultimately asking the agency to
remove him from their home. Meanwhile, the parent is granted parole, expects to be
released shortly, and seeks custody (see also Dependency of
I. W, 1998).
How should a court respond to an absent parent’s demands for continued visitation and custody? The child’s best interests must weigh heavily in the decision,
but that is not necessarily a sufficient response to the claims of parental rights,
especially if the parent has completed drug counseling and was a model prisoner.
On the other hand, it is hard to imagine how a parent newly released from prison,
without an apartment or a job, whose kin were not available to care for the boy
when the parent was sentenced, will be able to handle the stresses of parenting a
demanding child while seeking to adjust to life after prison. These conflicting
priorities of mothers’ rights and children’s needs may be irreconcilable both as a

matter of generally applicable law and as applied to specific cases. Congress concluded that such conflicts must be resolved in favor of the child’s needs, whether or
not the mother is at “fault” in the sense of intent, omission or other facts suggesting
accountability as opposed to strict liability. When a court is confronted with such a
choice, the child’s interest outweighs the parent’s claim because the legislature has
made it clear that the consequences of any other decision are too harmful to the
child and, ultimately, to society (In re Doe, 1994, McMorrow, J., dissenting). As the
State of Washington’s highest court pronounced even prior to the ASFA regime,
“when the rights of parents and the welfare of their children are in conflict, the
welfare of the minor children must prevail” (In re K. R., 1995, p. 146).
This child-centered view does not depend on any interpretation of mothers as
good or bad, self-sacrificing or seLfish. It reflects the law’s intervention as defender
of those least able to protect themselves. The law presumes that adult women can
rise to their own defense even if they have been victimized, but that children cannot.
Even within that framework, however, the principle of balancing irreconcilable
claims in favor of the child rather than the mother should not allow the law to
sidestep the analytical question of how to reconcile placing children first with the
liberty interests of parents, as it attempts to do under ASFA’s 15/22 month rule.
In the final section of this paper I turn to a category of cases involving domestic
violence, in which the independent but mutually supportive interests and liberty
claims of mother and child may remain congruent in the face of the challenge the
15/22 month rule poses to their ability to survive as a family.
3.2. Battered Mothers and Their Children
A large number of incarcerated women, presumably including some of the jailed
substance abusers discussed in the previous section, have experienced domestic
abuse (Cahn, 2003). But many other victims of domestic violence who have no
history of drug abuse, have never been imprisoned and have neither abused nor
neglected their children, the women who are the focus of this section, are also at
risk of having their children removed from their care. Advocates for battered
women and their children have succeeded in promoting the widespread realization
that children who witness domestic violence are its victims even if the children do
not suffer physical trauma themselves (ABA, 1994; Edelson, 1999). This
development, however, had an unanticipated effect when it resulted in the removal
of children from battered mothers who had succeeded in protecting them from
witnessing any abuse, or who had successfully extricated themselves from their
relationships with their abusers (Gische, 2000).
Mothers who are victims of domestic violence too often become the subjects of
“double abuse,” in the words of District Court Judge Jack Weinstein: first by a
partner and then by the state “through forced unnecessary separation of the mothers
from their children on the excuse that this sundering is necessary to protect the
children” (Nicholson V. Williams, 2002, p. 163). In re Nicholson (2002), a case that

should become a landmark, Judge Weinstein considered the claims of a class of
battered mothers whose children were deemed neglected by the New York City
Administration for Children’s Services (the City) solely because the mother was a
victim of domestic abuse. (The court also considered the claims of a court-created
subclass of their children.) Judge Weinstein reflected early on that the case involved
“three sometimes conflicting principles”:
First, as a parent, a mother has rights to uninterrupted custody of her children and a child has
rights to remain with parents; within wide limits, adults and children in a household are immune
from state prying and intrusion. Second, domestic abuse — particularly if physical — of a mother or
child will not be tolerated. Third, the state has the obligation to protect children from abuse,
including, where clearly necessary to protect the child, the power to separate the mother and
child (p. 164).

The court held that the City had violated the right of mothers and children to live
together (the first principle) by misconstruing its mandate not to tolerate domestic
abuse (the second principle) and by unjustifiably relying on that mandate when it
misused its power to separate children from their mothers in order to protect the
children from abuse (the third principle).
The ten women named as plaintiffs in Nicholson display remarkable similarities.
Not one plaintiff mother had struck or physically abused her child. Indeed, the
definition of the class omitted battered mothers who had abused their children or
were still failing to protect their children from abusers. In each instance, one or
more children were removed from a battered mother either because the batterer had
also attacked the child (and the mother had “failed to protect the child”), or more
commonly, because the mother either had not extricated herself from the abusive
situation or, in the process of trying to separate from her abuser, entered a
transitional situation that was not deemed appropriate for the child (such as no
longer having an apartment to live in). In many instances, mothers included in the
class had been charged with neglect or abuse based on strict liability, even though
their children had not witnessed the abuse and had not suffered either physical or
emotional harm in the mother’s home.
The sharp parallels to the problems that ASFA’s 15/22 months rule creates for
mothers with histories of substance abuse, discussed above in Part 3.1, are readily
apparent, including the reluctance of many mothers to seek help (even if it were
available) due to fear that scrutiny will lead to removal of the children from the
mother’s home (Lemon, 1999). Mothers who are victims of domestic violence,
however, have an even stronger argument than substance abusers that they are not
“at fault,” especially in light of the many obstacles to separating from an abusive
situation. These obstacles include the increased physical danger to the woman and
her children in the period immediately following her departure, the lack of domestic
violence shelters, an inability to find permanent housing, and a lack of employment
(Kintzel, 2002).
The published opinions in the case mention ASFA only once, in the context of

the complex interacting federal, state and local statutes and regulations implicated
by the issues in the case (Nicholson, 2001). The interaction of the City’s treatment
of abused mothers and the ASFA time line was not an issue in Nicholson, and the
record does not indicate that any of the named class representatives in Nicholson
suffered the termination of parental rights (perhaps in part because they were well
represented once they became part of the class). But the issues of removal, passage
of time, and delay are likely to mean that some proportion of mothers who are
victims of domestic violence will lose their children permanently, for no other
reason than that City agencies acted with “benign indifference” while the clock ran
to 15 months (2002, p. 163). In an interim opinion on Nicholson, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that a serious substantive due process question
would arise if a child were removed from a “blameless” parent and asked the State’s
courts to determine “whether removing a child from a battered mother serves the
interests of the child” (Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 2003, pp. 173—174). The matter is
still pending.
In considering the Second Circuit’s question, New York’s highest court should
acknowledge the child’s independent interest in remaining with his or her mother
and siblings. Under some circumstances, where the child seeks to maintain a
relationship and the child’s safety can be assured, the child’s interest in preserving
at least a legal relationship with a biological family constitutes a corollary of the
mother’s interest in preserving her parental rights. But ASFA ignores the child’s
potential claim. It imposes a legal presumption that every child who has been in foster care for 15 out of 22 months would be better off severing ties with her biological
parents and moving into a new permanent situation, unless the case falls within one
of the three enumerated exceptions. The statute assumes that although the natural
parent may continue to speak legally for the child until the termination proceedings
are completed, the state, advocating termination, more accurately represents the
child’s best interest, and does not provide the child with an independent voice. In
many, or even most, instances, the state may indeed express the child’s real interests, especially in cases involving physical abuse of the child. But ASFA leaves no
discretion for taking into account that some individual children (especially those of
“blameless” parents) may have a liberty interest in preserving their natural families.
(The sole exception under ASFA involves older adolescents who may refuse to
consent to adoption.)
The psychological and emotional detriment to a child who is separated unnecessarily from a parent (and siblings) has been well documented (Arredondo &
Edwards, 2000). The child suffers the trauma of separation, leading to such
symptoms as fear, anxiety, depression, a diminished sense of self and regressive
behavior. For children separated from their mothers because of domestic violence,
all of the symptoms associated with loss occur at the same time that the child
“confront[s] an unfamiliar and often dangerous foster care system,” including the
frequent pattern of separation from friends, neighborhood and school (Nicholson,
2002, p. 253). Children frequently believe that they are responsible for the breaknp

of the family following domestic violence just as they do in cases of divorce. The
intensity of those feelings may be exaggerated where the state intercedes due to domestic violence because the child does not know whether the battered parent is safe.
But experts suggest that separating a child from an abused mother may be compared
“to pouring salt on an open wound” (Nicholson, 2002, p. 199). When children who
are safe with their mothers experience removal as aggravating their fears, the state’s
claim that removal serves the child’s best interests is materially undermined.
The right of a mother and child to remain together arguably does not belong to
the mother alone. The Second Circuit recognized a “right to the preservation of
family integrity encompassing the reciprocal rights of both parent and children a
quarter of a century ago in Duchesne v. Sugarman (1977), and reiterated what it
termed a “fundamental right” to “remain together” in 1999 (Tenenbaum v. Williams,
p. 600). Finding a “mutual interest in an interdependent relationship,” the Court of
Appeals identified what it labeled “consistent support” in Supreme Court decisions
concerning the rights of parents (Duchesne, 1977, p. 825). In Nicholson, Judge
Weinstein expanded this doctrine by enunciating an interest in “familial integrity,”
which guarantees all family members a right not to be separated from each other
(2002, pp. 233—234).
Supreme Court opinions skirt the issue but offer some support for the argument
that the liberty interest is reciprocal. In Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989), for
example, the plurality expressly noted that the Court “never had occasion to decide
whether a child has a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in
maintaining her filial relationship” and declined to do so in what it construed as a
case involving a claim to preserve a child’s relationships with two “fathers,” one
biological and the other — the mother’s husband — statutory (pp. 130—131). In a
compelling dissent Justice Brennan went a step further. He recognized that the
relationship between the biological father and his child constituted “a liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause,” and acknowledged the child’s claim
that she too had a “liberty interest” in that relationship (p. 151). Most recently,
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Troxel v. Granville, reiterated that “this court has not
yet had occasion to elucidate the nature of a child’s liberty interests in preserving
established familial or family-like bonds.. .“ But, he continued, “it seems to me
extremely likely that, to the extent parents and families have fundamental liberty
interests in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these
interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the equation” (Troxel,
2000, p. 2072).
The significance of a child’s bonding to only one primary caretaker was central
to the classic “psychological parent” model promulgated by Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit (Goldstein et al., 1996). Their theories, which have proven so influential in
federal and judicial decision making about child welfare issues, are not without
critics. Some authors, for example, suggest that patterns of “multiple attachments”
hold promise for children (Davis, 1996). Such an approach would bolster Justice
Brennan’s willingness to entertain the viability of a two-father paradigm and

supports the more general notion that children benefit from a network of stable
attachments. A modification to the single psychological parent approach, suggested
by a doctor and an eminent juvenile court judge, proposes that child welfare
decisions focus on what they term “reciprocal interconnectedness,” considering the
spectrum of relationships between children and their caregivers (Arredondo &
Edwards, 2000). Under this proposal, a court would weigh the parent’s attachment
to the child as well as the child’s attachment to the parent, focusing on the
interrelatedness between the particular child and his or her various caregivers.
I have argued in a variety of other contexts that children may have liberty interests independent of their parents, and that the law should take the young person’s
expression of those interests seriously (Ross, 1996, 1999a, b). Applied to ASFA,
this argument suggests that where child and parent each assert a complementary
independent liberty interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, the court
should weigh the child’s argument heavily. Despite its intended focus on the child,
ASFA, as currently designed, does not afford courts the opportunity to take the
individual child’s views into account. Allowing a child’s views to be heard does not
mean that the child’s preferences will trump all other arguments. Among other
things, even seriously abused children frequently have strong feelings of attachment
to their abusers, and the child’s safety must remain paramount.
Existing sibling relationships may be a factor in the resistance some older
children mount to adoption because termination of parental rights also terminates
the legal relationship between siblings who may be placed separately. Many
children in foster care have indicated that one of the most painful parts of their
expenence was the loss of siblings (Ross, 1999a, b). When one sibling is adopted,
and others remain in foster care, they often lose touch with each other completely.
Termination also severs ties with other blood relatives including grandparents,
aunts, and uncles, with whom the child may have a beneficial relationship of long
standing.
Some young people are sophisticated enough to fight to retain important family
ties. One 14-year-old resisted an adoptive placement that involved moving out of a
foster home in which he had resided for eight years. He insisted that his younger
sister needed him and talked about setting up a household in which he and his sister
could live together. He fantasized that if the parental rights of his severely
neglectful and detached mother were terminated, he would claim custody of his
sister from wherever she had been placed when he graduated from the system at age
eighteen. Responding to the state’s notion that he could no longer linger in the legal
limbo of foster care for the four years that remained of his minority, he stated
simply, “the law is retarded.” He may have been too harsh. But in this instance
perhaps the law may be described as “doctrinally challenged.”
The complexity of parental termination cases may not be amenable to the
attractive simplicity of a timeline or any other mechanistic solution. It may not be
possible to respond categorically to the needs of all vulnerable children. The
application of general principles to specific cases may be more likely to lead to

sensitive decisions about each neglected child. This approach would not require us
to throw out the ASFA reforms, but rather would call for continued tinkering. The
ultimate goal should be to replace blanket presumptions — whether they favor
parents, as in the old regime, or children, as in the ASFA regime — with nuanced
appraisals of individual relationships that enable judges to respond to the individual
child who is, under ASFA, the proper focus of any termination proceeding.

4. CONCLUSION
Termination and permanency call upon decision makers to exercise delicate
judgments in which they take cognizance of two competing visions of the rights of
children: the right of each individual child to be nurtured, and the autonomy rights
of the each child, which will not always support the same result. In the child welfare
context, children clearly have a right to be protected and cared for, if not by their
parents, then through the state’s intervention. As much as children need to be taken
care of, simple substitution of one paternalistic presence (the state) for another (the
biological parent) may not be sufficiently responsive to children’s claims. Just as
ASFA recognizes that children’s interests may diverge from those of their parents,
so too may the interests of children diverge from the presumptions enunciated by
the state. From the perspective of rights theory, children often have both a
procedural and substantive interest in preserving family relationships that benefit
them and an equally strong claim to be legally free to join a new family where the
facts warrant it.
If we lived in a world where no child was ever removed unnecessarily, every
child who was removed returned home as soon as basic safety could be assured, and
well-designed services were available to all who needed them, then a sound legal
ground for termination would generally exist after the passage of 15 months. In
such a hypothetical world, one whose existence ASFA presumes, the state would be
able to demonstrate the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence
without relying on the mere passage of time. In this hypothetical universe, by the
time the state filed for termination of parental rights the claims of mother and child
would usually be at odds just as ASFA presumes them to be.
In the messier world that mothers and children actually inhabit, cases at the
margins elude easy solutions. These marginal cases raise two separate and equally
important legal problems. First, the mother’s constitutional interests in her relationship with her child require that the state establish clear individualized grounds
for termination. The passage of time, without more, does not appear to satisfy the
heavy burden imposed on the state. Second, the child in any individual case may be
better off retaining a legal relationship with her mother. Thus, the court considering
a petition for termination should be required to hear any arguments a child offers for
preserving the relationship and should have discretion to take those arguments into

account. Both of these issues may be addressed if courts are required to assess the
likelihood that an individual parent will be a fit or unfit parent for the individual
child in the near future, rather than relying solely on a categorical 15-month rule.
The irrebuttable presumption embedded in ASFA’s 15/22 month rule fails to do
justice to every mother and every child that appear in a termination proceeding. The
rule prevents courts from considering the narratives of each individual mother and
child and of their unique relationship. It ignores context in favor of a bright line
rule. In accounting for a child’s sense of time and need for continuity, the resolution
of each child’s case requires consideration of the individual child’s unique
strengths, vulnerabilities, personal history and desires. The law, a crude instrument
at best, needs to endeavor to respond flexibly to the minority of cases in which an
individual child would be better off returning to his or her mother even after the
passage of time.
The lack of clear legal grounds for termination under the 15/22 months rule is
the elephant in the room that no one wants to talk about. The legal grounds for
termination after 15 months in foster care must be clarified, and the standards must
address due process concerns. Clarification would reassure both child welfare
agencies and the courts that hear their termination petitions that “permanent”
decisions will withstand subsequent judicial review in the rare instances where an
appeal is filed. Sensitivity to the constitutional stakes for parents is doctrinally
required. A predictive approach, involving judicial scrutiny of whether a parent is
likely to be able to resume safe parenting within the child’s time frame, is the test
least likely to violate constitutional rights. The predictive approach at its best would
integrate consideration of the child’s best interests with assessment of parental fault
by asking whether this individual parent would be able to resume parenting
responsibility for this individual child, considering the child’s specific
developmental needs and time frame.
Children whose circumstances diverge from ASFA’s bright line approach to
termination would benefit from restoration of discretion within the parameters of a
rebuttable presumption that children who have been in foster care for 15 of the last
22 months should be legally free to enter a new permanent family. Such restored
flexibility would enable courts to respond appropriately to individual children
whose circumstances do not fit the normative model. An approach that incorporates
this flexibility without giving judges unlimited discretion might even help both
mother and child come to terms with the court’s decision regardless of who “wins”
and who “loses” in any given termination proceeding. A clear nexus between the
passage of time and a constitutionally sufficient showing of parental fault would
help to insure that the relationship between mother and child is not terminated
needlessly in cases where their interests converge, and would also enable courts to
take into account the unique child’s point of view, rather than the viewpoint the
state imputes to all similarly situated children.

NOTES
1. A prima facie case is one that “on the face of it” permits a presumption that a
fact is true unless disproved by evidence to the contrary.
2. Res ipse loquitur, the thing speaks for itself, is a “doctrine providing that, in
some circumstances, the mere fact of an accident’s occurrence raises an inference of
negligence so as to establish a prima facie case” (Garner, 1999, p. 1311).
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